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Abstract
This paper considers the effect of international air-pollution agreements rat-
ified since 1970 on carbon dioxide emissions (CO2), the main cause of anthro-
pogenic climate change. The analysis is based on a panel dataset of 150 countries
over the period 1970-2008. While the literature generally focuses on one partic-
ular agreement, we analyze the effect of the accumulation of agreements using
a two-way (country, year) fixed effects regression model. We find that the rela-
tionship between the number of ratifications and CO2 emissions is statistically
significant and linearly decreasing.
Keywords: Air-pollution treaties, CO2 emissions, panel data.
1 Introduction
Due to the transboundary nature of the problem of climate change, international co-
operation is essential. Hundreds of press articles have emphasized the failure of the
global climate change agreements negotiated so far, in particular the so-called Kyoto
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Protocol, that was defined as a sinking ship by CNN (December 13, 2011). The eco-
nomic literature is also very skeptical. Barrett [3], for example, states that “Kyoto does
not provide the supporting incentives needed to effect a change in behavior over time”.
The objective of this paper is to revisit these pessimistic views since, even if we agree
that the outcomes of specific treaties (such as the Kyoto Protocol) are very limited,
we believe that there could be a virtuous accumulation effect of other non-CO2 specific
treaties.
Indeed, a single source generally emits global pollutants as CO2 as well as more
conventional air-pollutants as SO2, NOx or VOC (e.g. see Barker [2] for the burning of
fossil fuels). These conventional air-pollutants are responsible among others of acid rains
and ambient air degradation. They are the targets of international treaties that follow
the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air-Pollutant (LRTAP, hereafter).
As they are very often realized with CO2 emissions, treaties flowing the 1979 LRTAP
Convention may have an indirect impact on CO2 emissions. This impact can go in both
direction. For example, switching from high to low sulfur coal to reduce SO2 emissions
will imply carbon reductions as a by-product. On the other hand, scrubbers installed in
power plants to neutralize SO2 use energy, and therefore, lead to more CO2 emissions.
To estimate the impact of these air-pollution treaties, we use a large cross-country
panel dataset over the period 1970-2008. We find that when treaties are considered
individually, air-pollution agreements have a significant effect on CO2 emissions but
we are unable to disentangle the effects of these agreements due to the large member-
ship overlap between them. In contrast, when we study the effect of the accumulation
of agreements, we eliminate the membership overlap problem. We find that each ad-
ditional ratification of an air-pollution agreement is (in aggregate) associated with a
reduction of CO2 emissions of about 4%. This effect holds and is even reinforced when
the number of ratifications is instrumented to cope with an eventual endogeneity of
treaty adoption.
The approach used in this paper differs from the existing empirical literature on
international environmental agreements. Indeed, almost all papers tend to concentrate
exclusively on one particular pollutant agreement in a short time span (Bratbeg et al
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[4]; Finus and Tjøtta [5]; Aakvik and Tjøtta [1]) while we consider all international
air-pollution treaties on a long time period. The structure of the paper is the following.
In section 2, the data are presented with some stylized facts. In section 3, the different
specifications used to estimate the model are presented. In section 4, we discuss the
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Stylized Facts
2.1 Data
To study the effectiveness of air-pollution agreements in reducing carbon emissions, we
use a large panel dataset of 150 countries over the period 1970-2008. The dependent
variable is given by the (log of) level of CO2 emissions (in kilotons). Data on emissions
come from the World Development Indicator (WDI) Dataset (World Bank, 2012 –
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators).
To select the international agreements targeting air-pollutants released with CO2
emissions in most industrial processes (our variable of interest), we refer to the Interna-
tional Environmental Agreements Database Project.1 A description of the database is
made in Mitchell [9]. We consider ratification rather than signature as it is reasonable
to assume that an agreement starts to matter once ratification through the parliament
has occurred. This is in line with other empirical analysis(e.g. Bratberg et al [4]). As
a robustness check in the Results section, we also use a different definition of our vari-
able of interest: an air-pollution agreement starts to matter after the treaty’s official
entry into force. The agreements of interest for this analysis belong to the Long-Range
Transboundary Air-Pollution lineage, which consists of 7 treaties targeted to conven-
tional air-pollutants, responsible for acid rains or degradations in ambient air quality.
This lineage started with the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution, which followed increasing concerns by policy-makers about the harmful ef-
fect of transboundary pollution caused by SO2 or NOx emissions that can travel some
1Version 2012.1, see http://iea.uoregon.edu/.
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hundreds of kilometers before deposition. This initial Convention was a declaration of
good will and served as a basis for the 7 follow-up protocols.
To control for confounding effects, we use a set of control variables as suggested by
the economic literature: economic activity measured by the Growth Domestic Product
(GDP in constant 2000 US dollars) and the GDP growth rate, Total Population, Trade
Openness measured as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services divided by
GDP, the composition of the economic activity measured by the shares of agricultural
and industrial productions in GDP and a Democracy Index (e.g. Friedl and Getzner
[6]; van Vuuren and Riahi [12]; Li and Reuveny [7]; Shi [11]).Data come from the WDI
Dataset, except the Democracy Index that comes from the Polity IV Database.
2.2 Stylized facts
Details on the air-pollution treaties used in this analysis can be found in the online
appendix (https://sites.google.com/site/aurelieslechten/research). It shows that the
number of ratifiers at the end of our sample period is roughly similar for all LRTAP
agreements (i.e. it ranges from 19 to 29). The identity of the ratifiers is also much the
same across them. At a country level, European countries are the ones that have ratified
the largest number of agreements. The gap in the number of ratifications between the
United States (US) and Europe has increased sharply since 1995. In contrast, China did
not ratify any international air-pollution agreement so far. Since the first ratification
of the Helsinki Protocol in 1985, the time span between two agreements is relatively
short (generally less than 5 years).
Concerning CO2 emissions, data show that both Europe and the US have reduced
their emissions between 1995 and 2008 while China’s emissions have increased sharply
during this period. From these first stylized facts, one might believe that it is because
European countries have ratified several air-pollution treaties that they were able to
reduce their CO2 emissions as a by-product.
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3 Specifications
This section details the specifications used to test whether the first insights from the
data can be confirmed. All the specifications are estimated using a standard panel two-
way fixed effects estimator. To control for heteroskedasticity and within country serial
correlation, standard errors are estimated using the Huber-White sandwich estimator,
clustered at the country level.
3.1 Agreement-specific model
We first estimate an agreement-specific model in order to test for the effectiveness of
each agreement individually (as it is usually done in the literature): for k = 1, ...7
log(CO2)it = αi + δt + βkrat(k)it−1 + Zitγ + εit (1)
where log(CO2)it is the log of CO2 emissions of country i in year t, αi is the country
fixed effect, δt is the time fixed effect and Zit is the matrix containing all control
variables for country i in year t. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is needed to
capture factors such as country specific technology, regulation, ideology and economic
conditions such as the world business cycle. The variable of interest is rat(k)it−1. It is
coded as a dummy variable:
rat(k)it−1 =
 1 if country i has ratified agreement k at t-10 otherwise (2)
3.2 Basic model
Due to the large membership and timing overlap between the treaties used in this
analysis (see Stylized Facts), it may be difficult to identify the effect of each agreement:
we cannot be sure that the impact captured by the previous specification is really the
impact of the treaty analyzed or the impact of a treaty ratified nearly at the same time
by similar countries.
Moreover, we believe that it is the accumulation of agreements that has an effect
on CO2 emissions. Indeed, the sources of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are
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various, so a unique air-pollution agreement can not tackle all the aspects of the prob-
lem. By ratifying additional agreements, countries might enrich the initial agreement
and control other sources of emissions. We thus estimate the following model, which
will be our basic specification:
log(CO2)it = αi + δt + β(#AIR)it−1 + Zitγ + εit (3)
where (#AIR)it−1, the variable of interest, is the number of air-pollution agreements





We expect the coefficient estimated for the number of ratified air-pollution agree-
ments to be negative and significantly different from zero. This would indeed imply
that ratifying an additional air-pollution agreement is associated with a reduction of
CO2 emissions in the ratifying country.
3.3 Non-Linear Model
To tackle a possible non-linearity of the relationship between agreements ratification
and CO2 emissions, we consider the following model:
log(CO2)it = αi + δt +
J∑
j=1
βjI((#AIR)it−1 = j) + Zitγ + εit (5)
where I((#AIR)it−1 = j) is equal to 1 if country i has ratified j agreements at time
t − 1. Coefficients βj will then be the reduction of CO2 emissions when j agreements
have been ratified. As it will be shown in the results (see section 4), the non-linearity is
rejected. Therefore, we keep the linear specification throughout the rest of the paper.
3.4 IV-GMM model
The results of the basic specification may be biased due to a possible reverse causality
between ratification and CO2 emissions: it is precisely because they are not the biggest
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polluters that European countries participate in many agreements (as they do not
pollute much, it is not very costly for them to ratify many treaties). To account for
this, we instrument our variable of interest, (#AIR)it and estimate our basic model
using an IV-GMM estimator for fixed effects models. Ratifying air-pollution agreements
signals a preference for multilateral international policy initiative. Our idea is to use
these preferences (that are not directly related to CO2 emissions) as instrument for our
variable of interest in the basic specification.
As a proxy for these preferences, we use the number of ratified environmental
agreements (a different kind of international policy initiatives) that do not address
air-pollution (treaties concerning the conservation of species and fresh water resources)
and a death penalty index. The argument behind the use of the death penalty index
is the following: a country’s decision regarding the death penalty and preferences for
multilateralism can both be related to a country’s conservatism. In the context of mul-
tilateral aid, Milner and Tingley [8] show that the preferences for multilateralism are
explained by the ideology of individuals, i.e. in the US, Conservatives are typically
much more opposed to sending multilateral aid. On the other hand, Neumayer [10]
shows that the political orientation of the government in power (e.g. Conservative) is a
significant determinant of the status of the death penalty. A more conservative (or tra-
ditional) and religious country will therefore be less prone to abolish the death penalty.
This is why we believe that decisions regarding the status of the death penalty will
be related to decisions concerning the ratification of international agreements through
cultural values such as conservatism and tradition. Finally, to be a good instrument
in the context of panel data, there must be sufficient heterogeneity among countries
regarding the abolition of the death penalty and the index must also vary over time.
This is the case as we reject the null hypothesis of no variation through time within a
country (the F-statistic is F(38,5662)=88.69, with a p-value of 0.00) and no variation
between countries (the F-statistic is F(149,5662)=109.43, with a p-value of 0.00) .
With these two instruments, our first-stage equation is given by:
(#AIR)it = α˜i + δ˜t + ψIEAit + φDPit + Zitθ + uit (6)
IEAit is the number of environmental agreements ratified by country i at time t (Data
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come from the the IEA Database) and DP is the death penalty index. The status of
the death penalty is constructed as follows (from Amnesty International): we measure
the status of the death penalty on a five-point scale (0-4), from constitutionally autho-
rization of the death penalty (0) to abolition of the death penalty for any offense in
both peace and war periods (4).
Our identifying assumptions are that (1) these instruments do not affect the level
of CO2 emissions directly, so that the instruments can be excluded from our second-
stage regression, and (2) ratification of these environmental treaties and the decisions
regarding the death penalty are not caused by the level of CO2 emissions.
4 Results
4.1 Agreement-specific model
Results for variable of interest (individual agreements) of the agreement-specific model
are presented in Figure1a. Results for the control variables are very similar to those
of models analyzed in the next section. It appears that all the LRTAP treaties have a
significant negative impact on CO2 emissions. Furthermore, their effects are relatively
similar. However, it is not clear which effect we capture, due to the substantial overlap
in terms of membership and timing.
4.2 Basic model
Results for the three other specifications are presented in Table 1. In all specifications,
the quality of the fit is rather good, since the within R-square is at least 0.65.
Results for the basic specification are shown in columns 1 to 3 of Table 1. This basic
specification tests for the presence of an accumulation effect of air-pollution agreements.
Column 1 and 2 report the results when we consider ratification as the point in time from
which an agreement start to matter (for different sets of control) while column 3 reports
results when a treaty’s entry into force is considered. Ratification by one country of an
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Figure 1: Results for Agreement-specific and non-linear models
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Table 1: Estimating the effect of the number of ratifications on CO2 emissions.
Dependent Variable: log(CO2)
VARIABLES Basic FE Basic FE Basic FE IV-GMM Non
(initial) (controls) (entry) Linear
#AIR (t-1) -0.059*** -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.090** See
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.040) Fig. 2
log(GDP) (t) 0.948*** 0.940*** 0.940*** 0.910*** 0.940***
(0.088) (0.107) (0.107) (0.113) (0.108)
log(Population) (t) 0.681*** 0.536*** 0.552*** 0.365* 0.506***
(0.159) (0.189) (0.188) (0.209) (0.192)
log(Openess) (t) 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.026
(0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056)
GDP Growth -0.585*** -0.707*** -0.703*** -0.752*** -0.702***
Rate (t) (0.139) (0.152) (0.152) (0.150) (0.152)
log(Prop. 0.105 0.106 0.082 0.101
Agriculture) (t) (0.086) (0.086) (0.113) (0.093)
log(Prop. 0.318*** 0.317*** 0.306*** 0.312***
Industry) (t) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092)
Democracy 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Obs 4,834 4,275 4,275 4,274 4,275
Within R-sq. 0.658 0.663 0.662 0.658 0.663
Countries 150 150 150 149 150
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses,
***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 2: IV Statistics.
Under-identification test Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 18.994
Chi-sq(3) p-value 0.000
Weak identification test Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 18.993
Critical value at 5%∗ 5% maximal IV relative bias 13.91
Over-identification test Hansen J statistic 2.637
Chi-sq(2) p-value 0.2676
*Note: Critical values for the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic
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of its CO2 emissions. This implies that if all countries ratify an additional air-pollution
agreement, the world CO2 emissions will be reduced by 4%.
Most control variables have the expected sign. A higher GDP level is associated with
higher CO2 emissions. The GDP growth rate coefficient has a negative sign, indicating
that energy efficiency improvements seem to offset increases in energy consumption
during periods of economic growth. The coefficients of trade openness and population
are not significant. Both the shares of agricultural and industrial productions imply an
increase of CO2 emissions, but only the industrial production has a significant impact.
4.3 Non linear model
The results for the non-linear model are presented in Table 1 (column 5) and in Figure
1b. The solid line corresponds to the estimated coefficients of the number of ratified
agreements (i.e. βj in the non-linear model). The grey area represents the confidence
interval.
The relationship between CO2 emissions and ratification of air-pollution agreements
seems to be linear. Indeed, the dashed line on Figure 1b corresponds to the linear
relationship between ratification and CO2 emission reductions estimated by the basic
specification, i.e. with a slope of 4% and this dashed line is completely included in the
confidence interval of the estimated coefficients of the non-linear model.
4.4 IV-GMM model
The results for the IV-GMM estimators are presented in Table 1 (column 4) and the
quality of the instruments is checked with tests defined in Table 2. Once we control for
reverse causality, the effect of ratification remains and is even reinforced (reduction of
about 9% of CO2 emissions).
Instruments are quite strong (see Table 2). Indeed, we are sure at 95% that the
bias associated to the coefficient of interest is at most 5% of that of OLS (weak iden-
tification test). The joint null hypothesis of the over-identification test, i.e. that the
instruments are valid instruments, is not rejected. From the under-identification test,
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we can conclude that the first-stage equation is identified, i.e. the excluded instruments
(IEA and DP ) are relevant (correlated with the endogenous regressor).
5 Conclusion
We show that there is an accumulation effect of the number of air-pollution agreements
on the level of CO2 emissions. In aggregate, the air-pollution agreements ratified since
1970 have had a significant negative impact on CO2 emissions. We also deal with the
problem of reverse causality by instrumenting the variable of interest (the number of
ratified air-pollution agreements). We use exogenous instruments and show that the
effect of ratification on emissions is reinforced.
This result indicates that the options used to reduce SO2 or NOx emissions imply
carbon reductions as a byproduct (e.g. fuel switching or use of low sulfur coal). An
interesting question is why these LRTAP agreements seem to have been effective in
reducing air-pollution, while a CO2-specific treaty as the Kyoto Protocol has been
considered as poorly effective in the literature. We suggest two interpretations based
on the nature of LRTAP treaties to explain their effectiveness. First, SO2 and NOx are
more local pollutants, compared to CO2. Intuitively, local agreements imply a higher
commitment than more global agreements: politicians have a greater incentive to set
more ambitious targets for local pollutants (and indirectly for CO2 as a by-product),
because the effects of this pollution are more visible to the voters. Second, LRTAP
treaties are more focused than the Kyoto Protocol, for example: each LRTAP treaty
deals with only one air-pollutant (except the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol) while the
Kyoto Protocol deals with different greenhouse gases. On the other hand, LRTAP
agreements have not only clear targets but well identified means to meet these targets,
whereas the Kyoto protocol has less clear means to achieve them. For example, the
annexes of these agreements include a description of the measures available to reduce
the pollutant covered by the treaty.
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